This special issue of Clinical Case Studies focuses on recent developments in the psychotherapy of schizophrenia. Approaches such as these are needed to address the multiple rate-limiting factors for psychotherapy outcome in this population, such as poor insight, comorbid disorders, low motivation, cognitive impairments, and self and interpersonal disturbances. In this introductory article, each of the case studies is briefly reviewed, with the goals of: (a) noting how each therapeutic approach fills a gap in current practice, and (b) placing the focus of treatment within a larger context of relevant research on schizophrenia. Concluding comments note the implications of these multiple therapeutic developments for future psychological treatment of schizophrenia.
The idea of treating people with schizophrenia has typically been greeted with cynicism for at least the past 50 years, at least outside of a subspecialty within psychoanalysis (see Lysaker & Silverstein [this issue]) . It can be argued that this has been a justifiable stance, given the negative findings from past controlled studies of psychodynamic therapy (e.g., Gunderson et al., 1984) , and difficulties applying a treatment developed for people with "neurotic" disorders to what is essentially a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized in many cases by severe cognitive and interpersonal impairments as well as paranoia and motivational deficits. Moreover, although positive results for cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) for psychotic symptoms have been reported (e.g., Wykes, Steel, Everitt, & Tarrier, 2008) , a recent large-scale review cast doubt on its effectiveness (e.g., Lynch, Laws, & McKenna, 2009) . In spite of this prevailing zeitgeist, developments in psychotherapy for schizophrenia have continued. New forms of psychotherapy for this 1 University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, Piscataway 2 Indiana University School of Medicine, Indianapolis population have been developed, and modifications to existing techniques-to make the approaches more suitable for working with psychotic patients-have been tried (Chadwick, 2006; Hogarty et al., 1995; Lysaker, Glynn, Wilkniss, & Silverstein, in press; Silverstein, 2007) . At the same time, reanalysis of old data has painted a more positive picture of what is possible from psychotherapy of schizophrenia (Bachmann, Resch, & Mundt, 2003; Gottdiener & Haslam, 2003) . Moreover, it has been pointed out that the recent negative assessment of CBT for psychosis was methodologically flawed in several respects (Kingdon, in press ). That study was also based on the untenable assumption that a therapy should be effective for everyone with a given condition who presents to a clinic. This negates the clinical reality that specific techniques and modifications may be necessary for people with specific clusters of traits or symptoms. Such individual "tailoring" of treatment may be especially necessary for people with schizophrenia, given the many potential clinical features (e.g., reduced motivation, poor insight, attention deficit, paranoia, schizoid traits, magical thinking, etc.) that can serve as rate-limiting factors of treatment response.
This special issue of Clinical Case Studies begins with a brief article on the history of psychotherapy for people with schizophrenia, which sets the context for the six case studies that follow. These in-depth descriptions of clinical work with single clients provide examples of the effectiveness of novel types or applications of psychotherapies for people with schizophrenia. What is demonstrated in the case studies is how specific therapies can be effective for patients who very likely would have been considered treatment failures in more traditional types of therapy, including CBT for psychosis. The focus of each of the articles in the series, and how and why the cases necessitate modifications of traditional approaches to schizophrenia will be briefly reviewed below. This will be followed by concluding remarks about the potential benefits of psychotherapy for schizophrenia.
Pervivoliotis, Grant, and Beck demonstrated how CBT for psychosis can be modified to treat people with poor insight and a high level of conviction in their delusion. As these two features are typically seen as contraindications for CBT for psychosis and as negative prognostic indicators in general (David, 2004; Garety et al., 1997) , widespread adoption of their method holds the promise of successful treatment of a wider range of patients than is now possible. Their case study also demonstrates a very important lesson-improvement in psychosocial functioning can lead to reductions in psychotic symptoms. Another interesting feature of the case presentation is that it demonstrates how the symptoms of schizophrenia are often exaggerations of premorbid personality traits and vulnerabilities. In addition, involvement of the family in the patient's therapy sessions, a modification not typically associated with CBT or other forms of individual therapy, facilitated treatment gains. This is a further demonstration of the flexibility that is often needed when treating people with schizophrenia. Perhaps the most important aspect of this case study is its demonstration that treatment, including psychotherapy, need not take the form of direct attempts at symptom reduction. This is important because the latter is an approach that many patients do not find compelling (Freeman et al., 2004) . Indeed in this case, attempts to expose the logical errors behind the patient's delusional thoughts only led to her being frustrated. This approach is consistent with another recent case study of a patient with high delusional conviction, in which the Jungian technique of archetypal amplification was used to facilitate exploration of the potential meanings of the hallucinatory experience around which the delusion was based, and therefore to promote cognitive flexibility, but without directly challenging the strongly held delusion and overwhelming the patient's narcissistic defenses (Silverstein, 2007) . Finally, an important consideration in the Perivoliotis et al. article is the extent to which, even though direct attempts at belief change were not made, changes nevertheless took place in cognitive functioning, especially metacognitive capacity, or the patient's ability to actively and adaptively reflect on and alter her own thinking. Clearly, changes in the patient's beliefs about her own life occurred, however, it also appears as if there were gains in her general ability to think about her own life and internal experiences. Exploration of the durable effects on metacognitive capacities of such a modified CBT, in cases where people initially appear to have poor insight, is an important future direction for research.
Marcello, Hilton, and Mueser present another, yet completely different, modification of CBT, for use with schizophrenia patients who have histories of trauma and current high levels of symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The development of the intervention that is described is important on a number of levels. For example, this intervention can effectively help individual people, as demonstrated in a randomized controlled trial (RCT; Mueser et al., 2008) (and a second large RCT is currently underway), and it addresses the consequences of trauma, a problem that has been estimated to occur in approximately half of people with schizophrenia (Read, van Os, Morrison, & Ross, 2005; Spence et al., 2006) . Moreover, the presence of comorbid PTSD is often associated with further comorbidity such as substance abuse and mood disorders, leading to further individual suffering, suboptimal responses to conventional care, and a larger burden on the public mental health system. Therefore, interventions that are directly addressed to the realities of comorbidity in schizophrenia are critical, yet missing, elements of our current therapeutic armamentarium. Marcello et al. describe an intervention that has been manualized, and that therefore has the potential for widespread use. Important features of the intervention are that it is tailored to people with the cognitive impairments of schizophrenia, and that it focuses on typical PTSD-related cognitive biases and their consequences (e.g., anxiety and depression). The intervention also helps patients develop strategies (i.e., "action plans") if, in specific situations, there is continued distress after the cognitive restructuring methods have been tried. The techniques, although manualized, are also able to be individually tailored, depending on the nature of the patient's distressing thoughts. As noted by the authors, this intervention reduced both PTSD symptoms and depression in the patient, consistent with past research. An unanswered question regarding the intervention is the extent to which broader gains in metacognitive capacity occur, the extent to which such changes persist over time, and the factors responsible for persistence or the lack of it. It would also be interesting to determine the extent to which the changes are because of decreased prefrontal cortex activity, as has been demonstrated in other populations receiving CBT (e.g., Goldapple et al., 2004) , and the extent to which direct reduction of limbic activity occurs via the breathing retraining or CBT methods (as is more typically found with medication). Finally, to what extent is the effectiveness of the intervention a function of premorbid levels of personality traits (including cognitive biases), genetic predispositions for hyperreactivity to environmental stressors (van Winkel, Stefanis, & Myin-Germeys, 2008; Wichers et al., 2009) , or reversals of epigenetic changes in stress reactivity that were caused by earlier abuse (McGowan et al., 2009) or fear conditioning (McGowan & Kato, 2008; Szyf, McGowan, & Meaney, 2008) ? All of these questions can be answered with current research tools, and the answers to these questions will help this treatment fit within the dawning era of personalized medicine. Similarly, as with pharmacogenomics, the tailoring of specific psychological interventions to people with known genetic characteristics or stress-related epigenetic changes in brain function (i.e., "psychoneurogenetics") will allow the therapy to be targeted most efficiently to those patients who are most likely to benefit from it.
Smith and Yanos describe a further adaptation of CBT for psychosis that represents an integration of the clinic and community psychiatry-delivering CBT within the context of assertive community treatment (ACT). In this case, the therapy was delivered in the patient's home, something that is atypical for psychotherapy. This development is another important example of how the treatment needs of people with schizophrenia are often different from those of people with other disorders (although many commonalities, those related to being human beings, exist). Specifically, it recognizes the need many patients have for a comprehensive set of services that are integrated (Liberman, Kopelowicz, & Silverstein, 2005) . In describing the intervention and the patient, Smith and Yanos, as did Perivoliotis et al. and Marcello et al. are also describing a modification of CBT for yet another population of patients who are often difficult to engage in treatment and who often respond relatively less well to treatment. In particular, they describe working with a person with schizophrenia with a history of poor premorbid social functioning (which is typically associated with poor adult social functioning, less social support, and related problems) and limited insight. Keeping in mind that psychotherapy is a human relationship, and that the capacity to benefit from psychotherapy typically assumes an ability on the part of the patient to develop a strong relationship with the therapist, the modification of therapy to address patients with a lesser capacity to do this promises to allow many more patients than is currently the case to benefit from our "evidence-based" interventions (which many such patients do not engage in or respond to). Another interesting lesson from Smith and Yanos's case study is that the goals of the treatment were modified to suit the patient's goals and tendencies (e.g., to only socialize in order to meet specific instrumental needs), which were more limited than those of his therapist. This is both consistent with a recovery orientation, and a cautionary tale about both the limits of treatment and the importance of not imposing therapist values and goals on patients.
Buck and Lysaker present what is essentially a novel approach to psychotherapy for schizophrenia, an approach tailored to the metacognitive capacity of the client and its evolution over time. This approach is informed by the recent accumulation of evidence that many schizophrenia patients have a reduced ability to reflect on their thoughts, and those of other people, and to incorporate this perspective into ongoing behavior (Green et al., 2008; Lysaker et al., 2005) . Hence, this form of therapy recognizes that for many patients, the ability to use cognitive restructuring or other CBT techniques may require that they first develop a level of metacognitive capacity sufficient to question their own beliefs. Suggested here is that application of CBT techniques which require metacognitive abilities persons do not yet possess could, therefore, increase stress and perhaps precipitate dropout or poor outcome. An interesting feature of this intervention was its incorporation of a measure of metacognition, the abbreviated Metacognition Assessment Scale (MAS; Semerari et al., 2003) . By using the MAS Self-reflectivity subscale, the therapist was able to both initially determine what level of cognitive complexity therapy should begin with, and to determine when the patient had progressed to the next level on the scale and was therefore ready for a more complex level of intervention. Note here that, as with the interventions described above, it is easy to see how the patient described in this case study might have been considered a treatment failure if a more traditional version of therapy, such as CBT for psychosis as delivered within a RCT and without modifications for metacognitive capacity, was delivered. An important aspect of this case study is that it recognizes the emotional (i.e., not simply cognitive) aspects of the patient's condition and the qualities of the therapeutic alliance which made it possible to discuss them. For example, the patient reported feelings of blankness, emptiness, and nothingness, alienation from self and a strong desire to be understood-phenomena which are not rare in schizophrenia but which are rarely the foci of treatment. The therapy described by Buck and Lysaker views statements of these internal states by the patient as being important, and the therapist's authentic responses to them as being critical points in moving the treatment forward. Finally, this therapy includes a focus on the development and elaboration of a personal narrative, which has been discussed previously as an important ingredient in personal growth and recovery (e.g., Lysaker, Davis, Jones, Strasburger, & Hunter, 2007; Lysaker, Buck, & Hammoud, 2007; Lysaker, Buck & Roe, 2007; Silverstein & Bellack, 2008) .
The importance of addressing metacognitive capacity in the psychotherapy of schizophrenia can also be seen in the case study by Salvatore, Procacci, Popolo, Nicolò, Carcione, Semerari, and Dimaggio. In this case, they describe a modification of Metacognitive Interpersonal Therapy (MIT; Dimaggio, Semerari, Carcione, Nicolò, & Procacci, 2007) , which was originally developed for personality disorders, and which targets metacognitive disturbances and related interpersonal difficulties. An interesting aspect of the case study is the appreciation that this patient may in fact be able to generate a metacognitive representation that accurately represents the current situation, but that it is her ability to choose this representation over other potential ones, in real time, that is compromised. The authors note her difficulty in prereflectively making this choice. Such a difficulty is also consistent with evidence of impaired executive control in schizophrenia, and of problems switching between potential response alternatives, as demonstrated in laboratory cognitive tasks (e.g., Knight & Silverstein, 1998) . This raises the question of what specific capacity is improving as a result of the adapted-for-schizophrenia MIT-the ability to generate a metacognitive representation, the ability to sense that this is the correct version of reality, or both. As with the Buck and Lysaker report, this case study stresses the importance of a regulation of the therapist-patient relationship, and of the therapist behaving in ways that convey the essential humanness of the client. It is interesting to contrast this to the "normalizing rationale" (Chadwick, Birchwood, & Trower, 1999) used in CBT for psychosis to discuss symptoms, and to wonder whether both interventions lead to similar strengthening of the therapeutic relationship. In an interesting twist on behavioral rehearsal and other CBT techniques, Salvatore et al. noted the importance of consolidating episodic memories of positive experiences of engaging in new behaviors during the therapy session. This is consistent with evidence of both episodic memory disturbance in schizophrenia (Leavitt & Goldberg, in press ) and more specific findings that this impairment is related to a reduced ability to bind self-representations with information about the event during memory formation (Danion, Rizzo, & Bruant, 1999) . Unlike in most situations, however, within the context of the therapeutic relationship, the therapist can supportively highlight specific behaviors, feelings, and interactions, and thereby help to overcome this disability as part of the process of strengthening the memory, therefore increasing the likelihood that the new behavior(s) will occur in the real world. Finally, the reader will note that the maximum length of MIT sessions is typically 40 minutes, and that it is recommended that session length be tailored to the level of functioning of the client. This is in clear contrast to what typically happens in outpatient psychotherapy, where difficulties productively using all of the 45 to 55 minutes of session time are often interpreted as resistance and defensive maneuvers. While this approach may be useful with patients with greater coping skills and less predisposition to psychotic decompensation, such an approach can be expected to be counterproductive with people such as the client described by Salvatore et al. and with patients with psychotic symptoms in general.
Nelson and Sass described an approach to treatment that is based on phenomenological philosophy, and the work of clinicians and researchers (including the authors themselves) who have applied this approach to understanding schizophrenia (see Sass [1992] and Sass & Parnas [2003] for reviews). More than the other techniques described above, the intervention they describe is concerned with the patient's experience of the self, especially the disturbed sense of self and its components of both excessive awareness of normally nonconscious aspects of experience (i.e., hyper-reflexivity), and of alienation from a sense of populating one's own experience (i.e., altered ipseity). This approach includes some of the features described in the therapies that focus on metacognition, such as the emphasis on the therapeutic relationship and the use of empathy. However, there are important differences as well, including the prescription of activities meant to promote a fuller absorption in one's intentional experience and a reduction of awareness of normally tacit mental contents. An interesting issue is the avoidance of interventions that are seen as encouraging metacognition, cognitive restructuring, or reflection on one's own experience. These are seen as potentially increasing the hyper-reflexivity that is at the core of the patient's disturbance. In making these recommendations, this treatment is essentially contraindicating many of the techniques that form the basis of the cognitive-behavioral and metacognitive therapies described earlier. What are we to make of this? One way to resolve the issue is to note that, just as each of the earlier therapies was developed to address a specific clinical issue (e.g., lack of insight, comorbid schizophrenia and PTSD, lack of motivation for therapy, metacognition impairments), the treatment described by Sass and Nelson is most appropriate for patients with prominent self-disturbance. Perhaps for such patients, techniques such as cognitive restructuring would be counterproductive, whereas for patients with excessive cognitive (attributional) biases without features such as hyper-reflexivity and altered ipseity cognitive approaches would be more effective. Consistent with this, it should be noted that the patient described by Nelson and Sass did not report delusions or hallucinations. This is both a very unusual presentation for schizophrenia (technically possible, but rare), and one that would not lend itself to CBT-type work, which typically focuses on delusional thoughts and ideation regarding hallucinations (which often, but not always, overlap). In addition, the patient reported an excessive degree of thinking about his own thinking and the disruptive effect of this on his interpersonal interactions, a feature which may also be a contraindication for CBT or metacognition-oriented therapies. Further case studies and controlled research are needed to resolve the issue of targeting specific treatments to varying clinical presentations. However, the question is being raised here in order to highlight once again the diversity of schizophrenia-related and comorbid features that are found in patients, and the benefit of having alternative approaches to choose from.
The patient described in Nelson and Sass's case study reported multiple examples of perceptual organization impairments, which, both based on clinical reports and laboratory demonstrations, have been associated with the type of schizophrenia characterized by a genetic predisposition and poor premorbid social functioning (i.e., "process schizophrenia"; Knight, 1984; Uhlhaas & Silverstein, 2005) . Silverstein and Schenkel (1997) hypothesized that these perceptual phenomena are one manifestation of a more widespread disturbance in the organization of mental representations (see also Phillips & Silverstein, 2003) . They hypothesized that this abnormality affects more global cognitive integrative operations (such as social cognition) at a young age, but does not affect more basic perceptual disturbances until the onset of psychosis (typically associated with sensory gating disturbances) in late adolescence or early adulthood. It is interesting in this regard that the patient in Nelson and Sass's case study demonstrated a family history of schizophrenia, and premorbid phenomenological and interpersonal disturbances which appear to be precursors of, and represent a vulnerability for, the anomalous self-integration experiences and perceptual organization abnormalities he later developed. This core cognitive integrative disturbance in schizophrenia has been described over the past 50 years (Carr & Wale, 1986; Chapman, 1966; Conrad, 1958; McGhie & Chapman, 1961; Matussek, 1987) , but, with a few exceptions (e.g., Shemberg & Leventhal, 1972) has not until now been a focus of treatment development efforts. However, this approach is consistent with the more Bleulerian approach of understanding schizophrenia as a disorder of psychological processes (including associative and autistic disturbances), as opposed to the more prevailing "Kraepelinian" view of schizophrenia and its latter-day incarnations in efforts at positive symptom reduction. In a sense then, although Nelson and Sass's intervention may appear to be the furthest from mainstream treatment of schizophrenia, it in some ways is closest, in its conceptualization of schizophrenia, to that put forth by the originator of the name of the condition.
In conclusion, in response to the limited effects of pharmacotherapy on community functioning, schizophrenia has recently been conceptualized as having four distinct treatment targets: positive symptoms, negative symptoms, cognitive impairments, and social functioning deficits. To these, we would add the fifth dimension of disorganization, as reflected in a range of phenomena from perceptual and conceptual disorganization to failures of binding self-and event representations during ongoing episodic memory formation to disturbances in the sense of self. To the extent that these five dimensions reflect separable processes, an intervention targeting only one dimension may fail to affect the others. Likewise, a patient whose condition primarily reflects a disturbance in one dimension may not respond to a form of treatment that addresses another. What we may be seeing with the following series of case studies then, is the embryonic stage in the growth of a range of psychotherapeutic treatments that can specifically address, or compensate for, these five aspects of schizophrenia. Although the interventions described in these articles do not represent the first attempts to address symptoms other than positive symptoms of schizophrenia (e.g., Hogarty et al., 1995; Perivoliotis & Cather, 2009 ), collectively, these case studies demonstrate that multiple groups are now working simultaneously to develop interventions that address negative symptoms (e.g., low motivation), cognitive impairment (poor insight and reduced metacognition), or disorganization (self-disturbance). It is also important to note that, in some cases, these developments move beyond an approach grounded in CBT, which has been the predominant method studied for the past decade. We hope that these articles stimulate others to try these techniques, to study them, and/or to develop other methods to address aspects of schizophrenia that for too long have only been considered negative prognostic indicators. Our hypothesis is that clinical trials of such interventions, when used with patients specifically selected for them on the basis of their symptom dimension(s), will demonstrate more positive outcomes than have resulted thus far.
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